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Abstract
We highlight the role of natural resources in the services sectors of countries that possess 
them by  specifically  incorporating  these  resources  into  a  model  of  service  provision 
where domestic incumbents and a foreign entrant compete. We find that domestic firms 
control most of the market share when natural resource prices are likely to go up but that 
industry output drops. However, the output of the services industry rises when natural 
resource prices are likely to increase but that the foreign firm gains market share in this 
situation. This suggests that a government focused on the growth and development of its 
economy should prefer liberalization when natural resource prices are likely to be higher.
JEL Codes: F12, F21, F23, O1
 Previously at the Saudi Telecommunications Company
1. Introduction
The Uruguay Round of trade talks is credited with bringing services into the fold of 
world trade rules. Services, which encompass a wide array of activities—from banking 
and telecommunications to engineering and legal services— and that account for almost 
two-thirds of all economic activity in some countries are clearly important for both 
developed and developing countries. The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) applies to access and competition policies in services markets, which account for 
more than $4 trillion of total trade (BOP basis) according to the World Trade 
Organization. Trade in services is expected to grow rapidly in the future. In fact, trade in 
services is said to be regularly underestimated because conventional methods do not 
account for the role services play not only in the trade of goods but also in the trade of 
other services such as finance (Deardorff, 2001).
The GATS in its current form is a work in progress. While it provides the opportunity for 
comprehensive policy binding, member countries reserve the right to determine the 
breadth and depth of the commitments they want to make and specify market access and 
national treatment obligations. Since the domestic regulation of service sectors plays a 
significant role as a barrier to trade in services, even liberalization achieved through the 
GATS leaves substantial room for individual member countries to impede free trade 
through the use of appropriately designed regulatory policies. This can be done under the 
guise of the need to maintain quality, protect consumers, and practice prudential 
regulation. This flexibility in the GATS, while playing an important part in launching the 
agreement, has also been a problem because of a lack of access commitments made by 
member countries. Many of the commitments that have been made find their root causes 
elsewhere. For example, the Republic of Korea’s commitment to liberalize the financial 
services sector can be traced down to the country’s accession to the OECD (Dobson and 
Jacquet, 1998).
Given this context, it is no wonder that analytical literature that deals with trade in 
services has started to emerge. However, it is still in its early stages and, compared to the 
theory of trade developed to make sense of trade in goods, it is rather scarce. Some 
notable studies include Hindley and Smith (1984) that argues for the applicability of 
comparative advantage principles to services trade; Deardorff (1985) that checks the 
assertion made by Hindley and Smith and concludes that comparative advantage applies 
to services trade under certain conditions; Markusen (1989) that emphasizes the role of 
knowledge intensity; and Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (1999) and Brown, Deardorff, 
and Stern (2000) that incorporate returns to scale and product differentiation. 
While Ricardian theory holds up well for services trade in many circumstances, the fact 
that numerous service industries are regulated and the classification in the GATS of 
commercial presence in the target market as a medium for international trade, makes the 
universal applicability of this theory questionable. Moreover, there are some important 
differences between goods and services trade. While Hill (1977) distinguished between 
goods and services trade by asserting simultaneity in the production and consumption of 
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services, the implications of this definition are fairly restrictive. One implication is the 
need for the producer and the consumer to be in the same location. Jones and Ruane 
(1990) and Francois (1990) model services trade drawing the distinction between goods 
and services. However, the GATS envisions trade in services to include the above 
definition as well as cross-border consumption. In view of this, Francois and Wooton 
(2001), Harms, Mattoo, and Schuknecht (2003), and Konan and Maskus (2004) analyze 
the liberalization of services in the context of imperfect competition and domestic 
regulation to address issues like cartel behavior and welfare impacts of this policy. 
This paper adds to the literature by focusing on the liberalization of services in natural 
resource-rich developing countries where resource revenues are used to subsidize 
employment in publicly owned monopolies. The case of the telecom sector in Saudi 
Arabia is used as illustration. The paper argues that trends in the global market for the 
natural resource can have strong implications for market share in domestic services and 
the decision to liberalize. This suggests that commitments made under the GATS should 
assess tendencies in global resource markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on trade and 
telecom services with emphasis on Saudi Arabia. Section 3 presents our model of 
services trade. In section 4, we discuss the results obtained and then conclude by offering 
a summary and some policy recommendations in section 5.
2. Services and Telecommunications Trade
The WTO Working Party pays close attention to the telecommunications sector in 
particular when negotiations are carried out for accession to the WTO. Consequently, 
market access and non-discriminatory treatment of multinational companies becomes a 
significant issue. Service sectors like water, electricity, health care, and 
telecommunications that are crucial for the development of an economy as well as to 
increasing the competitiveness of export industries are characterized by less competition 
than other service sectors. Domestic markets in these sectors tend to be dominated by a 
public monopoly. One result of this feature often turns out to be an unfair advantage 
favoring the incumbent. This is clearest, for example, in the case of telecom, for the need 
of the entrant to connect to the existing network that is mostly owned and controlled by 
the incumbent1.  
Many services sectors, particularly telecommunications, are characterized by rapid 
technical change. This often means that entrenched monopolies in services find it 
1 It is worth noting, however, that commitments made by WTO members to services liberalization still 
remain quite low. For example, out of the 149 WTO member countries, only 45 have committed to the 
liberalization of 80 or more service sectors. This is out of about 160 service sectors and sub-sectors that the 
GATS identifies.  In addition, revenues from privatization tend to vary across countries. For example, while 
Mongolia’s national telecom operator raised $11 million in 1995, Deutsche Telekom went for about $13.4 
billion in 1996 (Adlung (2000) quoting Besancon and Kelley (1996)).
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difficult to maintain control over the activities carried out in their sectors. Thus, in many 
developing countries, this tilts the playing field in favor of liberalization. However, in the 
case of natural resource-rich countries, the urgency is mitigated if the monopolies happen 
to be publicly owned enterprises. This is due to the ability of these public entities to 
better control alternative technologies given their access to subsidies made possible by 
revenues generated by the natural resource2. This gives the government more control over 
the decision regarding the possibility and timing of any liberalization of the service sector 
according to their economic and political readiness.  In the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, for example, where governments were-and to a lesser extent today 
continue to be-employers of last resort, the privatization and liberalization process of 
public utility companies has been slow compared to other regions of the world.  This has 
been especially true in the telecom sector.  Figure 1 below shows that while privatization 
in the developed countries has been the highest,  ITU reports that Arab countries have 
been slow to privatize their incumbent telecommunication operators accounting for only 
8% of the world’s privatized carriers (partial or total) and the number of countries that 
have privatized represent 38% as of 2001. In addition, the percentages of those countries 
that allow competition in basic services (such as fixed-line local or long-distance 
telephony) are even lower as seen in figure 2 below (ITU-Trends in Telecom Reform 
2002) 
Fig1: Percentage of Countries That Have Privatized Their National Telecom  Operators 
By Region (2000)
38%
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74%
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Asia-Pacific
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Source: ITU World Telecom m unication Regulatory Database, 2001
.
Fig 2: Percentage of Countries that Allow  Com petition in Basic 
Te lecom  Services By Region (1999)
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Europe
Source: ITU World Te lecom m unication Regulatory Database, 2001
2 This control can be the result of a variety of reasons including both financial  and non-financial; for 
example, VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) technology is illegal in several of these countries because it 
cuts into the profits of international calls which represent a major chunk of fixed and cellular telephony. 
Non-financial reasons include security and culture.
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While privatization is an instrumental tool in the restructuring of state enterprises, 
economists warn that privatization needs to be part of a more comprehensive program 
that “entails creating jobs in tandem with the inevitable job destruction that privatization 
often entails…[Therefore] [t]iming and sequencing is everything.” (Stiglitz 2003). A 
good example of this ‘timing and sequencing’ is East Asian countries which took 
advantage of globalization by expanding their imports and using the income from the 
increased economic growth to gradually and systematically drop protective barriers, 
phasing them out only when new jobs were created.  These countries ensured that there 
was available capital for the creation of new enterprises and jobs and took an active role 
in promoting such new enterprises (Ibid).
This East Asian policy seems to be the way that natural resource-rich developing 
countries are heading.  In expectation of higher oil prices, the rate of privatization in the 
MENA region especially in GCC countries has been trending upwards.   This not only 
reflects the increased income from the export of natural resources-mainly oil-which 
increases the demand for private shares, but also reflects the future income expectation of 
governments in their efforts to withstand the political costs that are expected to emanate 
from the inevitable restructuring of the Telecommunications sector-mainly the cost of 
restructuring of the labor market.
Table 1 below shows the actual privatization levels of 2003 and 2004 for the 
telecommunication industry measured by the proportional share of total revenues3.  The 
table shows that the actual level of privatization has been on the rise in the short period 
between 2003 and 2004, a period representing the expected rise in world oil prices.4 
Notice that while the privatization levels among MENA countries have been relatively 
lower among the GCC countries, their percentage change-with the exception of Oman 
and Kuwait-over the one year period of 2003-2004 has been among the highest especially 
that for Saudi Arabia which represents a 50% change over the previous year.
Table 1
Country WTO Telecom Telecom Percent 
3 This is obtained by the multiplication of each operator’s share of total revenues by the percentage shares 
owned by the government, public sector institutions, local private sector and foreigners in the country.
4 The level of privatization and state ownership in each of the above countries is based on the full 2003 and 
2004 revenues.
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Accession 
Date
Privatization 
Level (2003)
Privatization 
Level (2004)
Increase
Jordan Apr-00 68% 77% 13%
Sudan 72% 73% 1%
Bahrain Jan-95 53% 66% 25%
Yemen 53% 61% 15%
Syria 46% 60% 30%
Algeria 48% 59% 23%
Kuwait Jan-95 55% 55% 0%
Egypt Jun-95 37% 53% 43%
Qatar Jan-96 35% 45% 29%
Morocco Jan-95 41% 45% 10%
UAE Apr-96 40% 40% 0%
Saudi Arabia Dec-05 20% 30% 50%
Tunisia Mar-95 12% 20% 67%
Oman Oct-00 0% 0% 0%
Source: Arab Advisors Group: http://arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-250905.htm
Table 2 shows the monopoly, duopoly and competitor distribution in selected MENA 
countries in 2004.  It shows that with the exception of fixed telephony, other services are 
slowly moving towards liberalization with more impending liberalization in the coming 
years.  Under the WTO agreement many of these countries are not only obligated to 
liberalize but also to privatize and allow foreign investments; Saudi Arabia for example 
has three years after accession to the WTO to allow up to 70 percent foreign equity 
ownership in the telecommunication sector. This applies to both basic telecom services 
and value added ones.
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Table 2
Country Incumbent 
Operator
Fixed Mobile Data Internet
Bahrain Batelco M D M C
Kuwait MOC M D C C
Oman Omantel M D M M
Qatar Q-tel M M M M
Saudi Arabia STC M D C C
UAE Etisalat M M M M
Egypt Egypt 
Telecom
M D C C
Jordan Jordan 
Telecom
M D C C
Lebanon MOT/OGERO M D* C* C*
Morocco Maroc 
Telecom
M D M C
Syria STE M D M D
M = Monopoly, D = Duopoly, C = Competitive
*Mostly under the management or BOT contract for the MoPT
Plainly shaded cells indicate monopoly, Diagonally shaded cells indicate further liberalization is 
expected (2004)
Source: Booz-Allen-Hamilton: http://www.bah.com
Table 3 shows the cellular competition intensity index (CCII) which assesses the level of 
competition in the MENA region’s cellular markets over the past two years5. Notice that 
Saudi Arabia represents the highest percentage change over the year between 2004 and 
2005.  Thus, while the kingdom was relatively slower than some other MENA countries 
prior to 2003, it has been moving faster than other countries- especially GCC member 
nations like Qatar and the UAE that have low unemployment and are resource rich-in the 
liberalization process.  Part of the reason for the delay is that the government had no 
immediate financial needs for privatization; unlike Morocco, Egypt and Jordan that 
started the liberalization process several years earlier, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich 
nations of the GCC countries did not need the privatization proceeds.  It was not in 
desperate need for money from liberalization.  However, the Saudi government in 
particular realizes that while it did not need the short-term capital inflow, employment 
opportunities for Saudi youth and the economy at large needed liberalization (Arab News 
2005).
5 The index calculation incorporates the number of operators, packages and services available in each of the 
listed countries and assigns a weight to each category based on its importance as a competition indicator.
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Table 3: Cellular Competitive Intensity Index for Arab Countries
Country CCII for 
2004
CCII for 
2005
Percent Increase
Jordan 67% 84% 25%
Algeria 52% 66% 27%
Morocco 59% 60% 2%
Saudi Arabia 31% 55% 77%
Yemen 55% 54% -2%
Egypt 50% 51% 2%
Tunisia 53% 49% -8%
Kuwait 44% 43% -2%
Lebanon 43% 42% -2%
Syria 42% 41% -2%
Bahrain 40% 36% -10%
Sudan 19% 32% 68%
Libya -- 29% --
Oman 23% 26% 13%
Qatar 20% 18% -10%
UAE 14% 13% -7%
Source: Arab Advisors Group: http://arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-250905.htm
Mobile services-analyzed as separate business units-are not only relatively new in the 
Arab world but have also been less subsidized by the governments in comparison to other 
basic telecom services such as fixed telephony. Because of their recent advent to the 
telecom market, they do not suffer from the underemployment that basic services had to 
endure.  In addition, the demand for mobile services has been on the rise for the past 
several years causing a significant jump in market share and a large percentage of the 
incumbent monopoly’s profits.  As such, they are relatively easier to restructure and 
regulate.  This is why liberalization of the mobile cellular services has been relatively 
more forthcoming. Thus it helps to serve as a testing ground for the overall liberalization 
process.  Figure 3 below shows that in the period where many fixed line services 
remained closed, some form of competition was allowed by 78% of ITU Member States 
in providing mobile services by 2002. Of these almost 47% allowed full competition and 
31% allowed a duopoly market structure. Thirty five countries (only 22%) continued to 
ban competition at that time.  And while the Arab countries were the most restrictive in 
admitting competition to their respective mobile markets, they were strengthening their 
commitments; by 2001 44% of the Arab countries allowed competition, up from 30% 
from the previous year (ITU—Trends in Telecom Reform 2002).
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Fig 3: Com petition in Mobile  Service in Arab Countries (2002)
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On the other hand, competition in basic services has been slowest in the Arab world 
compared to other regions by 2004-as can be seen from table 2 above-and as early as 
2001. While the Europeans had taken the lead with 50% of its countries allowing it, 
countries in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific represented 42% and 38% respectively, 
while only 15% of the Arab countries allowed some form of competition in such services. 
African countries represented the highest leap from the previous year with 34% of its 
countries allowing some form of competition; almost a fifty percent increase over the 
previous year.  However, it is important to note that only a handful of these countries 
especially in Arab and African countries had a second fixed line carrier to compete with 
the incumbent operator (ITU—ibid). See figure 4 below.
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Unlike sectors like agriculture and textiles, where suppliers are better organized than 
consumers and are therefore able to effectively mobilize resistance to liberalization, 
service sectors like telecom do not face this type of problem of asymmetry. This is 
because the consumers of these services are likely to themselves be suppliers in other 
sectors with substantial stakes in efficiently functioning sectors upstream in the 
production chain. This setup would then be able to counter and perhaps overcome the 
resistance to liberalization. Nowhere, perhaps, is this truer than in the case of the telecom 
sector, which is widely regarded as the backbone of any economy and critical for 
development and growth.
An increasing number of studies now demonstrate the benefits of liberalization and 
competition in services. However, protection remains the mainstay in these sectors. 
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Although Laffont and Tirole (2001) suggest that carefully designed barriers to entry can 
enhance welfare, the reasons primarily have to do more with political economy and infant 
industry considerations. Since public monopolies in developing countries are routinely 
used to employ the population, any possibility of restructuring due to liberalization or any 
other reason is seen with suspicion as it inevitably leads to a loss of jobs6. 
Non-tariff barriers in the form of administrative hurdles and red tape characterize the 
trade regimes in the Middle East in general, and Saudi Arabia is no exception. To 
facilitate gains from trade it is necessary that trade-related transactions costs be 
minimized to the biggest possible extent. Of particular relevance to the telecom sector is 
the prevalence of licensing requirements, which often indicate a country’s regulatory 
regime. However, there has been a gradual move toward liberalization in countries like 
Saudi Arabia and a commitment to the removal of all non-tariff barriers in an effort to 
meet the requirements of WTO membership. Living up to its liberalization commitments 
in the context of its recent accession to the WTO should prove less challenging given its 
current account surplus estimated at $51.5 billion for 2004 according to the CIA World 
Fact book and $57 billion for 2005 according to recent estimations. A trade rule relevant 
to the services sector is the Foreign Capital Investment Act according to which foreign 
capital has the same concessions as national capital. New investment laws to liberalize 
the process further are already in the course of being formulated. The main Saudi body 
with the responsibility of approval of import licenses in the telecom sector is the 
Commission of Information and Telecommunication Technology (CITC). These licenses, 
which are for importing wireless sets and radio communications apparatus, serve to 
control frequencies. The equipment is required to meet technical specifications set forth 
by both the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Saudi authorities.
To pave the way for accession to the WTO, Saudi Arabia approved a bill in May of 2001 
liberalizing the telecommunication sector-a prerequisite for becoming a WTO member-
ushering in the start of foreign investments and competition.  A regulatory agency, the 
Saudi Communication Commission, later renamed the Communication and Information 
Technology Commission (CITC) was established in 2001 to oversee the telecom market. 
The new agency has initiated a process of competition to the Saudi Telecom market that 
is seen by some as ambitious given the social conditions and the maturity level of Saudi 
economy.  In particular, the GSM market which represents about 70% of the Saudi 
Telecommunication Company’s (STC) revenue was opened for competition in August 
2004 with the entrance of a consortium led by Etisalat of the United Arab Emirates. 
Etisalat had submitted a bid of $3.24 billion for the license, the highest bid among the six 
short-listed competing consortia. An additional $201 million license fee was approved for 
third generation service provision.  Etisalat will own 35% of the Etisalat Consortium 
Company with 20% of the company’s stock available to the public and the remaining 
45% shared between the Saudi General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI), which 
6 An illustrative comparison is that between Egypt and the UK; at around 6.2 million on the payroll, the 
Egyptian government employs two thirds of the total work force while the British government, with a 
similar sized population, employs only 650,000 (Egypt Investment Report 2002).
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will hold 15%, and multiple of major Saudi companies which will hold the remaining 
shares7.
In addition, the CITC has announced that it is opening the door for competition in fixed 
telephony by the end of 2006 according to the latest news reports. Other competition in 
the telecom sector include two competitors in the data services, twenty two internet 
service providers and five VSAT operators8.
The path to liberalization of the Saudi telecom sector has been reflective of the policies of 
engagement with WTO negotiations and the current economic and political conditions of 
the country.  On the one hand, the accession to the WTO will undoubtedly bring in 
economic benefits to the kingdom, the last member of the GCC countries to join the 
WTO.  On the other hand, the competition will require the burdensome task of 
restructuring of the old governmental institutions which for over the past thirty years has 
been the employer of last resort for its citizens9.  The CITC, therefore, was keen on 
making sure that not only both the incumbent and the new entrant are profitable while, at 
the same time, consumers benefit from the increased competition, but also that additional 
competitors are allowed to enter the market.  One example that shows such keenness is 
the control on downward price pressures administered by CITC in the early stages of 
competition; various attempts by the incumbent operator to reduce prices in GSM 
services were met with refusal by the Saudi regulator even though such prices were 
clearly not anti-competitive when benchmarked by other comparable operators10.  The 
rationale from a CITC standpoint is clear; too much reduction in prices at this early stage-
although beneficial to consumers-are not so for the industry as a whole especially for the 
new entrant that needs to recoup its $3.21 billion investment.  Another example of the 
government and regulatory policy is the various announcements by high officials with 
regards to the entry of additional competitors in both the GSM and fixed services and 
their rights to build their own network infrastructure especially the international 
gateways-some thing which has been fought over in the Saudi courts (Diwan Al-
Mazalim) between CITC and STC. These latest legal events indicate, on the one hand, 
the political direction that the country would like to take given its commitments to the 
WTO membership and, on the other hand, the incumbent’s resistance to such measures 
given its sense of lack of readiness for increased competition at the publicized time lines. 
It is noteworthy at this juncture to point out the inconsistencies that occurred in the Saudi 
telecom sector in the past two years; the council of ministers’ (COM) resolution number 
171 of 9/9/2003 states in its fifth paragraph that the mobile market shall begin partial 
liberalization in the last quarter of 2004, while fixed telephony shall begin (partial) 
7 Aljomaih Holding Company, Rana Investment Company, Abdullah & Said Binzagr Company and Riyadh 
Cables Group of Companies will hold 6% each of the remaining shares.
8 VSAT stands for Very Small Aperture Terminals.
9 In particular, utility companies such as STC suffer from a serious case of underemployment which was 
carried over from the Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs resulting in over twenty thousand 
employees—a large number when benchmarked with other comparable companies around the world.  
10 One of the authors was privy to such meetings when he held the position of Director of Regulatory 
Affairs at STC. We mention benchmarking of cost here, because STC does not have a cost structure for its 
business units. Accounting separation is one of the directives that STC is supposed to implement.
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liberalization in 200811.  This implied-based on international experiences-that any use of 
the PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) and Data networks are to remain a 
monopoly until that time.  This also implied that the reference to partial competition was 
intended to allow for the timely restructuring of PSTN services.12 
The unfolding of events, however, proved otherwise. In mid August of 2004, it was 
announced by the COM that licenses have been approved for a new mobile operator and 
two new data service operators. In addition, it was stated that the new entrants would 
have the right to build their own international gateway as well as their own network13.  It 
was further announced that a third mobile operator would be licensed for operation in the 
Saudi market by 200614.  Such events can be interpreted as a re-evaluation on the part of 
the policy makers of the prospective economic growth lead by an expected continuation 
of rising oil prices and the ability to absorb any political cost that may ensue from the 
restructuring of the telecom market.
In addition to underemployment of many ex-ministerial/government institutions, there 
remains the issue of worker skill especially in the telecom sector which is in dire need for 
skilled nationals to replace the expatriate workers that currently occupy these positions.
The dilemma, as mentioned earlier, for countries like Saudi Arabia is two folds; one is 
the need to promote competition in the services sectors concomitant with the WTO 
agreement and commitments; second is the need to balance the liberalization of these ex-
governmental sectors with the political fallout of unemployment that will undoubtedly 
result from full privatization of these institutions15.
11 The flow of the sentence implies that fixed telephony liberalization will also be partial, but it could also 
be interpreted as complete liberalization. There is no English translation for the COM decision.
12 PSTN services have been marginalized through out the world under similar experiences and are certain to 
face the same fate in the Saudi fixed telephony market.
1311 It is important to note here that the COM, which in decision number 171 mentioned above, stated a 
‘partial’ liberalization has now approved a total form of liberalization for the new competitor.  Also, it is 
important to mention that this announcement has occurred while the license debate as still pending in local 
courts. In its public announcement (PN No. 10/1424 on 15/11/2003) the commission stated that “In 
relation to the progressive liberalization of the communications sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
("the Kingdom"), the Council of Ministers Resolution No. (171), dated 02/07/1423H, (09/09/2003G), 
provides for the opening of the Saudi cellular mobile services market to competition in the fourth quarter of 
2004”. There is no mention, however, that resolution no. 171 stated a ‘partial’ liberalization. 
14 This announcement was mentioned in several local newspapers in August 2004 (see Al-Riyadh 
18/8/2004 issue # 13204 for example) and was referenced in the price cap decision number 43/1425.
15 Despite the favorable analysis of the liberalization of telecom markets in Asian and Latin American 
countries which shows considerable job growth in competitive markets (20.8%) vis-à-vis monopolies 
(3.2%) and, subsequently, the increase in demand for telecom workers (Wellenius, October 1997), and 
despite the argument that governments can launch a retaining program to capture the excess workforce, 
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries differ in two main aspects.  One is that much of the technically 
oriented telecom jobs are held by expatriate labor at lower demanded wages than nationals. Second, is that 
the main source of income for these countries comes from one main natural resource, i.e., oil, the prices of 
which are relatively unstable, and not from major good or service industries as is the case of Latin and 
Asian countries.
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The question then is the following: Given the need to enter and commit to the WTO 
membership, what is the path of liberalization that a government should adopt in order to 
mitigate any political fallout that can result from the labor market restructuring.  The 
short-run strategy for countries in which governments have traditionally been the 
employer of last resort is to ensure that any such restructuring can be accomplished 
during the time of high income from its natural resources.  In other words, for the telecom 
service industry that suffers from underemployment, the regulatory strategy would be to 
allow competition not only in accordance with what the market can contain, but to 
regulate prices in such a way so that all the market players-especially the incumbents-can 
retain reasonable profits. This strategy is likely to take place at the early stages of 
liberalization where governments still hold the majority of the incumbents’ share and 
revenues from natural resources are not sufficient to compensate for rapid restructuring 
efforts.  On the other hand, the path to liberalization should take a faster approach when 
income from natural resources are high and the government can, therefore, absorb the 
costs of restructuring.  Such restructuring will not only mean the repatriation of labor, but 
also the need to put in serious plans for raising the level of education and improving the 
technical skills of nationals for taking up positions in the telecom sector in replacement of 
the current expatriate labor force16. In addition, this requires restructuring the overall 
economic base; this means diversification of the economy so as to reduce the risk of oil 
dependency and move towards a developed economic structure; this is the long-term 
strategy outlook that must be adopted.
The model in the next section describes the outcome of entry of a foreign firm given the 
economic and political setting described above.
3. The Model
Service sectors in many developing countries consist of publicly owned enterprises. For 
example, the finance sector is often comprised of several national banks that operate as a 
cooperative oligopoly. In contrast, sectors where the service is the provision of utilities—
electricity, water, telecom—mostly contain one publicly owned monopoly. Keeping this 
imperfectly competitive market structure in mind, we develop a simple model of foreign 
entry into a domestic services market. The focus of the model is on deriving the effects of 
competition on the incumbents and implications for policy for a government whose goal 
is to maintain the viability of the publicly owned firms. The model, therefore, does not set 
out to study the impact of liberalization on welfare. Instead, the analysis attempts to 
identify conditions under which it would be most desirable for a country to meet its WTO 
obligations to liberalize while, at the same time, safeguarding its interests in the 
incumbent firms. In particular, the model investigates the role of natural resource prices 
in these service markets of countries that are endowed with natural resources.
We consider a regulated home market where a homogeneous service is provided by n 
identical domestic firms and a single foreign firm. The foreign firm faces costs of 
establishing itself in the home country and barriers to providing the service to domestic 
16 A December 13, 2005 issue of the Saudi Newspaper ‘Arab News’ indicates that 26% of the $148 billion 
revenues for 2005 will be spent on education and training according to the Saudi monarch underscoring the 
importance of an educated and skilled workforce.  It is also reported that the 2005 budget surplus is 
estimated at $57 billion.
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consumers. These barriers can be taxes that foreign firms are required to pay on each unit 
sold by them in the home market. However, domestic regulation and bureaucratic red 
tape as barriers to services trade are better interpretations given the much more 
significant role these play in services trade and the GATS. While it is possible in many 
cases to provide the service across borders (referred to as mode 1 in the GATS) without 
establishing commercial presence (referred to as mode 3 in the GATS), establishment 
costs do not affect the decisions of the foreign firm for maximizing profits in our model.
We employ a simple linear market demand function given by:
)( fh qnqyxP +−= (1)
The quantities produced by the two types of firms are appropriately subscripted with h for 
the home firms and f for the foreign firms. We use these as our subscripts to differentiate 
between the domestic and foreign firms throughout the paper.
Marginal costs of both domestic and foreign firms have two components. Both types of 
firms have constant economic marginal costs denoted by c. In addition, the foreign firm 
pays a per unit cost t due to the barriers it faces in providing the service in the home 
country as discussed above. Domestic firms, on the other hand, face an 
‘underemployment’ cost u in addition to the economic marginal costs. These 
underemployment costs reflect employment subsidization in the domestic firms by the 
government. Thus the government uses revenues it earns from the sale of its natural 
resources to absorb some of the unemployed in the economy into the publicly owned 
service providers. Labor is employed in this manner to score political points for the 
regime in power. This underemployment cost depends on the price the natural resource 
fetches. So, when the natural resource price is high, revenues from their sale are high and 
therefore the cost to add people to the payroll of the domestic firm is low (i.e., it is easy 
to finance this underemployment or, in other words, to subsidize the domestic firm). A 
lower natural resource price corresponds to a higher underemployment cost. The price of 
the natural resource is stochastic from the point of view of the foreign firm. Its stochastic 
behavior from the standpoint of the foreign firms is based on the observation that 
countries that supply natural resources on the world market are one of handful suppliers 
and consequently have at best substantial control over prices or at least superior 
knowledge regarding their future movements. Since a country like Saudi Arabia wields 
considerable (though not total) control over oil prices, domestic firms are in a position to 
have a fairly good idea of which direction—up or down—oil prices are likely to go into. 
Hence, u is stochastic from the point of view of the foreign firm that has access to market 
analysis that assists in attaching probabilities to the high and low price events. The costs 
for the foreign firm are given by:
Tqtcc ff ++= )( (2)
The firm has entry and establishment costs given by T and marginal costs given by (c+t). 
The costs for the domestic firms are:
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h
H
h qucc )( +=  with probability θ
(3)
h
L
h qucc )( +=  with probability )1( θ−  
Domestic firms incur high underemployment costs Hu  when natural resource prices drop 
with probability θ  and low underemployment costs Lu  with probability )1( θ− . Note that 
LH uu > .
Let )(* Hh uq  denote the optimal quantity choice of the domestic firm when 
underemployment costs are high, )(* Lh uq  when they are low. For the foreign firm, it is 
simply *fq . Under Cournot assumptions, the n domestic publicly owned firms cooperate 
with each other and solve the following profit maximization problem:
( )[ ] hifhq qucqnqyxh )()(max * +−+− ,  i=L, H
The foreign firm solves:
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] Tqtcqunqyxqtcqunqyx ffLhffHhfq f −+−+−−++−+−= )()1()(max ** θθpi
The first order conditions obtained from solving the preceding maximization problems 
are:
( )[ ]HfHh ucyqxynuq +−−= ** 2
1)( (4)
( )[ ]LfLh ucyqxynuq +−−= ** 2
1)( (5)
( ) ( )[ ])()()(
2
1 **** L
h
L
h
L
hf uynqtcuquqynxy
q −+−−+= θ (6)
Using (4), (5), and (6) we arrive at the following equilibrium conditions for quantities, 
price, and profits in our Cournot model.
[ ] [ ]tcuux
n
ucx
yn
uq LHHHh 2)1(6
1
2
1)(* −−−++−−−= θθ (7)
[ ] [ ]tcuux
n
ucx
yn
uq LHLLh 2)1(6
1
2
1)(* −−−++−−−= θθ (8)
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1* tuuyucyyxxP LHH θθ (10)
( ) *** )( hih qucP +−=pi ,   where i=H, L (11)
( ) TqtcP ff −+−= *** )(pi (12)
We now proceed to analyze these results. More specifically, we examine the role of 
natural resource prices and trade barriers and the implications for the decision to 
liberalize.
4. Analysis and Implications
The equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section can now be used to analyze 
the effects of natural resource prices and fulfilling commitments under the GATS 
(interpreted as changes in trade barriers here) on output and market share, service price, 
and profits. Since the subsidization of unemployment depends on natural resource prices, 
which therefore influence the output decision of the foreign firm, we begin with an 
examination of the impact of changes in the probability of movements in the price of the 
natural resource. Recall that θ  is the probability of high underemployment costs and thus 
low oil prices in the future. Simple comparative statics applied to the equilibrium 
conditions derived in the previous section yield the following results:
( ) 0
6
1)(*
<−=
∂
∂ HLih uu
n
uq
θ
, where i=H,L (13)
( ) 0
3
1*
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∂
∂ LHf uu
q
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(14)
( ) 0
2
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Te results above provide important and relevant information. From (13) and (14) above, 
we see that as θ  increases, i.e., as the probability of ending up with high 
underemployment costs (or a low price of the relevant natural resource) increases, the 
quantity the domestic firms produce in equilibrium goes down. However, the higher θ  
becomes, the higher the quantity the foreign firm produces in equilibrium. This means 
that if the world market perceives that natural resource prices are going to go up, 
domestic firms would produce more and the foreign firm would produce less. In addition, 
(15) shows that an increase in θ  lowers the equilibrium price. Given the linear demand 
function in the model, this implies that the equilibrium output of the industry increases. 
But since an increase in θ  leads to lower domestic output, this means that the foreign 
firm gains market share by increasing production by more than the decrease in the output 
of domestic firms. The opposite holds if θ  decreases—industry output drops but 
domestic firms gain market share. Hence, if the government wants to meet its WTO 
obligations to liberalize while minimizing the loss in the market share of the publicly 
owned incumbents, the best time to do it would be when world natural resource markets 
anticipate prices to go up. If we additionally believe that the foreign service provider 
builds infrastructure when it increases output and gains market share, the host country 
gains without the government taking an active role in infrastructure provision. We now 
complete our analysis by discussing the effects of changes in θ  on profits.
Note that (16) and (17) above have not been signed as positive or negative. Several 
factors determine the ultimate sign. We therefore take a closer look at these expressions. 
Case 1. We proceed first by assuming that the difference between the price and marginal 
costs for both domestic and foreign firms, i.e., ))(( * iucP +− in (16) and ))(( * tcP +− in 
(17), is positive. Using (13) and (15), it is clear that under this assumption, (16) is 
negative. Hence, an increase in θ  here reduces the profits of domestic firms. This 
supports the suggestion above that the government would find it more acceptable to 
liberalize when natural resource prices are increasingly likely to go up.
For the foreign firm, the effect of a change in θ  is still ambiguous. Therefore, the right 
hand side of (17) can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. We start with the last 
case by writing the following:
( ) 0)( **** =
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+−
θθ
Pq
q
tcP f
f
Multiplying both sides by *
1
P
 and some simple algebra allows us to write:
( )
**
* 1)(
ε
=
+−
P
tcP
Here, *ε  is the price elasticity of demand for the service and the term on the left hand 
side is the price-cost margin for the foreign firm. The expression above is well known in 
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the industrial organization literature as the pricing rule for a monopoly. This makes sense 
in our model since if the left hand side is equal to the right hand side above, the foreign 
firm is a monopoly and 0
*
=
∂
∂
θ
pi f , implying that perceptions of the world market 
regarding the price of natural resources do not affect the profits of the foreign firm. This 
would be true if the foreign firm is operating alone in the services market with no 
domestic firms competing against it.
If the first term exceeds the second term in equation (17), foreign profits depend 
positively on θ  while they have a negative relationship if the magnitude of the second 
term is bigger than that of the first. In either case, the likelihood of foreign profits 
increasing with increasing θ  is higher, the higher the price-cost margin relative the 
inverse elasticity of demand. This means that whether foreign profits go up with rising θ  
depends very much on (1) how efficient the foreign firm is (as reflected by its economic 
marginal costs, c) and (2) how high barriers to delivering the service to domestic 
consumers are for the foreign firm (as reflected by t). In short, a positive relationship 
between θ  and foreign profits is more likely to exist the more efficient the foreign firm, 
and the lower the barriers to delivering the service. This also means that the possibility of 
lower future natural resource prices alone is not sufficient for the foreign firm to 
anticipate higher profits. In fact, if the foreign firm is not very efficient, or if domestic 
regulation governing the services sector is too restrictive, then even the likelihood of 
lower future natural resource prices is not enough to ensure higher foreign profits. 
However, it is important to point out that a higher θ  does lead to higher output by the 
foreign firm and, as noted earlier, ultimately a bigger market share.
Case 2. Reversing the assumption we started with, i.e., now assuming that the difference 
between the price and marginal costs for the firms is negative, the relationship between θ  
and foreign profits clearly becomes negative. Higher θ  therefore means lower profits. 
This makes sense since if marginal costs exceed the equilibrium price and output is raised 
with rising θ , profits would indeed go down. For domestic firms, the situation is similar 
to the discussion for the foreign firm under Case 1. That is, we obtain the monopoly 
pricing rule for n=1 (the pricing rule for a cartel with n cooperative firms when n>1) 
when domestic profits are independent of θ  implying that there is no foreign firm in the 
market. Domestic profits are more likely to drop when θ  increases if home firms are 
either very inefficient or if the cost of subsidizing underemployment is very high. Again, 
we observe that the impact changes in θ  have on home profits rests also on home firm 
efficiency and the nature of the need to appease the domestic population by employing 
them in public enterprises.
Bringing the information in the above analysis together, we see that, generally speaking, 
an increasing probability of lower future natural resource prices causes home profits to go 
down and foreign profits to increase. But this depends considerably on the costs of either 
type of firm. Specifically, the above is valid the more inefficient the domestic firms, and 
the higher the costs of subsidizing employment in these government run service 
providers; and the more efficient the foreign firm and the lower the barriers to service 
delivery in the domestic market.
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At a more intuitive level, it is easy to see from (7)-(12) that higher barriers to trade, t, 
cause domestic equilibrium output to go up, foreign output and profits to drop, and prices 
to rise. Also, as economic marginal costs, c, increase, foreign equilibrium output and 
profits go down. For domestic firms, the impact of a change in c on output depends on 
the elasticity of the demand curve. This is clear from the partial derivative below.




−=
∂
∂
ync
qh 1
3
1
2
1*
(18)
The relationship between domestic output and c is negative if the right hand side in (18) 
is less than zero. For that to be true, y should be less than 3. If it is greater than 3, a higher 
c leads to higher domestic output. But note that y is the slope of the demand curve. 
Therefore, the model suggests that when demand is relatively elastic, decreasing 
economic marginal costs lead to higher output while when demand is relatively inelastic, 
decreasing marginal economic costs result in lower output. In both cases, profits increase 
demonstrating that (18) agrees with classical economic theory.
5. Conclusion and Further Research
The liberalization of services is of increasing interest and concern to both developing and 
developed countries. Developing countries that are members of the WTO and those that 
are not but aspire to join are required to move decidedly in the direction of liberalization 
of services as envisioned by the GATS. In most such countries service providers tend to 
be publicly owned and are often used by the government to hide grave problems in the 
labor market by hiring the unemployed and moving them into the realm of the 
underemployed instead. This approach is used more heavily in natural resource rich 
economies that use resource revenues to subsidize underemployment. This paper 
analyzes service markets in such countries to shed light on the impact of natural resource 
prices on output, profits, and service prices. We find that while all variables of interest 
move in the expected direction, it only happens if certain conditions are met. More 
specifically, domestic firms lose market share and earn lower profits with increasing 
probability of lower resource prices if they are grossly inefficient and if the need to 
subsidize underemployment is high. Under different circumstances, lower chances of low 
natural resource prices might not be enough to cause a loss in market share and profits of 
domestic firms.
Foreign firms gain market share and enjoy higher profits with higher probabilities of 
lower resource prices if they are highly efficient and barriers to service delivery, such as 
restrictive domestic regulation and bureaucratic red tape, are low. Given a country that 
wants to maintain considerable control over its service markets following liberalization, 
the government would find it best to open up its markets when the probability of lower 
resource prices in the future is high. However, if domestic firms are sufficiently efficient 
and if pressures to employ large populations in the public sector are low, the domestic 
industry can make profits even if lower future natural resource prices are likely.
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Even when the future price of the natural resource is likely to fall and, as our analysis 
suggests, the share of the domestic firms in the markets shrinks while that of the foreign 
firm grows by more than the decrease experienced by domestic firms, the country 
acquires infrastructure provided by the foreign firm. This not only boosts growth and 
development, especially if backbone service sectors like telecom and finance are 
considered, but also has the potential of positively affecting employment by offering 
more opportunities to the domestic population. In this sense, liberalization is most 
beneficial from a development point of view when in fact natural resource prices are 
likely to dip.
There are a few directions in which this research can be taken in the future. A relatively 
simple variation of our model that relaxes the assumption of the same marginal economic 
costs for both domestic and foreign firms can be instructive. It is likely that the foreign 
service provider is more efficient than the incumbents and this can have interesting 
implications for output and prices that should be worth exploring. Another direction to 
consider is solving the model as a Stackelberg game rather than a simultaneous move 
Cournot game. This would better capture the advantage that incumbents are likely to have 
in the domestic service industry. Finally, since sequencing is a crucial issue in services 
liberalization, a dynamic version of this model would be very useful in shedding light on 
when the required steps in the liberalization process should be taken to maximize gains. 
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